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We study competitive economies in which rms make risky investments
and markets allow decision makers to fully insure against aggregate outcome
uncertainty|but not necessarily against all primitive states of nature. It is
well-known that the ability to contract upon a complete description of states
of nature is unnecessary for achieving an ecient allocation of resources across
consumers. The same is not immediate for the productive sector because the
map between primitive states and aggregate output levels depends on endoge-
nous investment decisions. We show that if each rm computes its value us-
ing \competitive beliefs" about how out-of-equilibrium input decisions aect
the probability distribution of its output, then competitive markets lead prot-
maximizing rms and utility-maximizing consumers to achieve a Pareto optimal
allocation of resources.
The authors gratefully acknowledge nancial support from CNPq.1 Introduction
Following the work by Leon Walras in the 19th century, the general equilib-
rium literature focused on understanding how anonymous markets coordinate the
production and consumption of goods in competitive economies. In this setting,
rms' productive decisions and agents' consumption choices are taken indepen-
dently, and market prices are the only instruments available to coordinate dierent
wishes. Hayek (1945) supported the view that competitive prices have the capacity
of aggregating the necessary social knowledge to induce ecient self-interested in-
dividual behaviors. This idea was rigorously formulated and independently proven
by Kenneth J. Arrow, Gerard Debreu and Lionel W. McKenzie during the 1950's.
They listed conditions for existence of a competitive equilibrium and proved that, in
absence of externalities and other market frictions, competitive markets lead prot-
maximizing rms and utility-maximizing agents to achieve a Pareto optimal alloca-
tion of resources. The information embedded in market prices should be sucient
to promote an ecient social coordination across decision makers.
Arrow (1953) and Debreu (1959) extended the general equilibrium analysis to
economies in which random states of nature aect productivity. They showed that
the standard analysis carries over to environments with uncertainty whenever de-
cision makers are able to trade a complete set of contingent claims|each of them
promising to deliver goods in the future conditional on the verication of a given
state of nature. However, verication of a state of nature is not a simple matter,
and most securities traded in modern nancial markets are contingent on observed
output instead of primitive states of nature.
We follow the recent contributions by Magill and Quinzii (2009, 2010) and ana-
lyze nancial economies in which asset payos depend on rms' endogenous produc-
tion and allow full insurance against aggregate outcome uncertainty. In a sequence of
recent works, Magill and Quinzii (2009, 2010) and Magill, Quinzii and Rochet (2011)
showed that this market feature could potentially matter in production economies.
Their works illustrate how subtle is the issue of dening an objective function for
rms in order to generate Pareto optimality in equilibrium. They claim that max-
imizing the present value of rms' prot does not lead to an ecient outcome. In
that respect, when nancial contracts available for trade only depend on rms' out-
comes, it seems that market prices have lost their fundamental role of conveying all
the requisite information to coordinate consumption choices and rms' investment
2decisions. Following a normative analysis, they propose an alternative criterion in
which rms should maximize their contribution to expected social welfare, taking
into account the impact of their investment choices on the utility of all participants
of the economy.
We propose to show that prot maximization can still be socially justied as a
decision criterion. We prove the Pareto optimality property of the competitive equi-
librium when rms maximize the present value of their prots, computed according
to what seems to us to be the natural extension of the concept to this framework.
Our main result shows that the prices of promises that are contingent on the ag-
gregate output convey the necessary information for rms and consumers making
decisions under uncertainty.
A key contribution of our analysis consists in dening the appropriate stochastic
discount factor to compute rms' net present values. In the standard Arrow{Debreu
approach, all relevant information for production and market transactions are em-
bedded in the underlying state of nature. In the output-contingent framing, however,
nancial markets do not distinguish across states of nature that lead to the same
aggregate output. This distinction is still relevant for the productive sector as en-
dogenous investment decisions aect the relationship between aggregate output and
primitive states of nature. We show that this issue can be taken into account through
beliefs that link the investment of each rm to a conditional probability measure
over this rm's output given the economy's aggregate production. In equilibrium,
these beliefs will be correct. When evaluating possible equilibrium deviations, rms
will be assumed to believe that their actions aect the probability measure over their
own production but not the probability of dierent aggregate outputs. In our view,
this is the natural way to accommodate the competitive price-taking paradigm to
this environment.
With this tool in hands, we carry the analysis and show that the market in-
completeness caused by the absence of state-contingent claims is not only irrelevant
from the exchange perspective but also for the production decisions. Indeed, if rms
have \competitive beliefs" about the conditional distribution of their prot given the
economy's aggregate output, then maximizing the present value of expected prot
using prices for aggregate output leads to Pareto eciency.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. We describe the stan-
dard state-of-nature approach in Section 2 and argue in Section 3 that consumers
3share the aggregate output risk in any Pareto ecient allocation.1 In Section 4, we
recall the reader that competitive equilibria are always Pareto ecient when utility-
maximizing agents and prot-maximizing rms are allowed to trade state-contingent
claims. Next, we introduce in Section 5 a nancial economy in which agents only
trade output-contingent securities that provide insurance against aggregate output
risks (allowing for market incompleteness with respect to the underlying primitive
states of nature). This is where our main contribution is placed. In our view, com-
petitive rms should not take into account the eect of their investment decisions
over aggregate variables. We dene beliefs about how changes in the investment
level of a given rm would aect the probability distribution of its own production
given the aggregate output. We show that competitive equilibria are Pareto optimal
in this output-contingent environment. To conclude the paper, we use Section 6 to
explicitly compare our work with the existing related literature. Appendix A is
reserved for a technical proof.
2 The Economic Environment
Consider an economy with two periods t 2 f0;1g, a single good, a nite set I of
consumers and a nite set K of rms. In the initial date (t = 0), each rm k makes
an investment ak in a set Ak  R+. Next, at t = 1, they are exposed to exogenous
shocks ! from a nite set 
. States in 
 represent primitive causes which likelihood
is given by an exogenous probability measure P. This probability is independent of
consumers' and rms' actions. Moreover, without any loss of generality, we assume
that every ! 2 
 is drawn with strictly positive probability.2
Technology. Investments and shocks lead each rm to produce an output yk in
a nite set Y k  R+ at t = 1. The production possibilities are represented by a
family f  (fk)k2K of random production functions, where
fk(!;) : Ak 7 ! Y k:
Denote by Y 
Q
k2K Y k the set of output proles. We can derive a transition
1In other words, from the consumers perspective, consumption choices can be represented by
random variables that are contingent on the aggregate output, and the commodity space does not
need to be the space of vectors contingent on primitive states of nature.
2The probability of an event A  
 is denoted by P(A). For singleton events f!g, we write
P(!)  P(f!g).
4probability a 7! Q(a) on Y by posing
Q(y;a)  P(ff(a) = yg):3
Since we will frequently consider the summation over rms' index, for every





The random aggregate production is represented by the function ! 7! f(!;a). We
let Z 
P
k2K Y k denote the set of all possible aggregate outputs and derive the





where Y (z)  fy 2 Y : y = zg. Expression (2.1) can also be written in terms of
primitive states since (z;a) = P(ff(a) = zg).
Preferences. Each agent i has initial resources consisting of an amount ei
0 > 0
of income at date t = 0 and the ownership share i
k 2 [0;1] of each rm k, where
P
i2I i
k = 1. Agents have no initial endowment at t = 1, so that all consumption
in that period comes from the rms' output.
Agent i's preferences are represented by a utility function Ui which is separable
across time and has the expected utility form for future risky consumption. Formally,
if xi
0 > 0 denotes agent i's consumption at t = 0 and 'i
1 is a probability measure on












t : R+ ! [ 1;1) is increasing, dierentiable, strictly concave and satises
the Inada condition.4
3We use fH = hg for the set f! 2 
 : H(!) = hg, where H is an arbitrary random function






53 Optimal risk sharing
The tradition in the general equilibrium literature is to represent agent i's con-
sumption possibilities by a pair (xi
0;xi
1), where xi




 is a state-contingent vector of consumption for t = 1. The















-allocation is a family ((x0;x1);a), where (x0;x1)  (xi
0;xi
1)i2I is the
consumption allocation and a  (ak)k2K is the investment vector. It is said to be





















-feasible allocation (( x0;  x1); a) is Pareto optimal (or ecient) if there
is no other 
-feasible allocation ((x0;x1);a) such that the associated consumption
allocation (x0;x1) Pareto dominates ( x0;  x1).5
Since Bernoulli functions ui
t satisfy Inada's condition, every ecient 
-allocation
(( x0;  x1); a) displays  xi
0 > 0 and  xi
1(!) > 0, for all !. It follows then that there exists











The random vector  m is called the 
-sdf associated with the ecient 
-allocation
(( x0;  x1); a).
Consider the problem of a social planner who simultaneously chooses consump-
tion and investment levels. At date 1, for each possible aggregate output z 2 Z,
the planner's task is the same for every exogenous state ! in ff(a) = zg: namely,
he has to redistribute the aggregate output z among consumers. It is then natural
to expect the random vector  xi
1 to vary only with aggregate output (or equivalently














1), for all i, with strict inequality for at least one i.
6to be measurable with respect to the random variable f(a)). Actually, since the
Bernoulli functions ui
1 are assumed to be strictly concave, it follows from Jensen's
inequality that there exists  zi
1 : Z ! R+ such that
 xi
1(!) =  zi
1(f(!; a)); (3.1)
for every exogenous state !.6
This leads us to introduce a dierent representation of consumption allocations.
Let a Z-allocation be a family ((x0;z1);a)  ((xi
0;zi
1)i2I;(ak)k2K) such that the
date-1 consumption only varies with the aggregate output, i.e., zi
1  (zi
1(z))z2Z.
Such an allocation is said to be Z-feasible if markets clear at t = 0 and (zi
1)i2I






The inter-temporal utility of (xi
0;zi












We can adapt in a straightforward manner the denition of Pareto optimality to
Z-allocations. In particular, given an ecient 
-allocation (( x0;  x1); a), there exists
an ecient Z-allocation (( x0;  z1); a) such that  xi
1 =  zi
1(f( a)), for each i. If we









=  (z); (3.3)
we obtain the following relation between the 
-sdf and the Z-sdf:
8! 2 
;  m(!) =  (f(!; a)):
We will use next section to recall the well-known result that the 
-sdf  m is a
sucient statistics to eciently coordinate decisions in competitive environments
with complete state-contingent nancial markets. A key contribution of this paper
6If u
i
1 were assumed to be concave (instead of strictly concave) then, for each Pareto optimal
allocation, there would exist an allocation satisfying Eq. (3.1) that generates the same prole of
utilities and marginal utilities.
7is to show that the Z-sdf   can play a similar role when there is a complete set
of aggregate-output contingent contracts. In particular, we will illustrate the role
played by the relation  m =  (f( a)) when we construct the \suitable" out-of-
equilibrium market value of rms.
4 Prices for primitive causes
The traditional approach introduced by Arrow (1953) and Debreu (1959) as-
sumes that markets are complete with respect to exogenous states of nature. For
each !, there is a claim traded at t = 0 which delivers one unit of consumption in
t = 1, contingent on the realization of !. These state-contingent claims are also
called Arrow securities.
Let p  (p(!))!2
 be the price vector of Arrow securities traded at date t = 0.
Given an investment level a, we denote by Bi


























The array ( p;( x0;  x1)) is an 
-competitive equilibrium associated with the
investment vector  a if (( x0;  x1); a) is 





 in the budget set Bi

( p; a).
In this environment, ecient investment levels are achieved when rms maximize
their net present value, evaluated at the equilibrium prices  p. We let V k

 : Ak  ! R
be the value function dened by
V k






We omit the simple proof of the following standard result.
Theorem 4.1. Let ( p;( x0;  x1)) be an 
-competitive equilibrium associated with the
investment vector  a  ( ak)k2K. Assume that each rm k has chosen  ak to maximize
V k

. Then, the 
-allocation (( x0;  x1); a)) is Pareto optimal.
The objective V k

 of rm k only depends on the rm's technology fk and equilib-
rium prices  p. The prices of the state-contingent claims convey all relevant informa-
tion about the available resources in the society. Firm k does not need to anticipate
8the investments made by other rms or the agents' consumption and utility func-
tions. In addition to that, when choosing  ak, rm k does not take the equilibrium
eect of  ak over  p into account. The same is true for agents when making their con-
sumption choices. These are behavioral assumptions that are inherent to the notion
of a competitive equilibrium and are intended to capture the idea that agents and
rms have no market power.
5 Prices for aggregate production
Markets based on primitive states ! as introduced in Section 4 are not common
since they are dicult to operate. Indeed, the primitive states of nature used to
model production risks are too complex for writing and enforcing of contracts con-
tingent on them. Modern nancial markets trade assets whose payos depend on
the observable prots of the rms.
Let us now recall the concept of a stock market equilibrium when agents only
trade contracts based on rms' outcomes. We subsequently show that if the mar-
ket structure allows insurance against aggregate production risks, then competitive
markets eciently redistribute resources among consumers. The last part of this
section is the core of the paper. There we show that if rms maximize prot, suit-
ably computed using aggregate output prices and \competitive beliefs", then the
equilibrium outcome is ecient.
5.1 Stock market equilibrium
In the spirit of Magill and Quinzii (2002), we consider two types of assets: the
equity contracts of the rms, indexed by the set K, which are in positive net supply,
and a set J of securities in zero net supply representing bonds and derivatives.
Security j's payo is characterized by an output contingent function Rj : Y ! R
describing the way the payo at t = 1 of contract j depends on the realized output
of the rms in the economy. The price at t = 0 of security j is denoted by qj, and
we let q  (qj)j2J denote the vector of security prices. The payo of rm k's equity
is dened by the function y 7! yk, and its price at t = 0 is denoted by Ek.
At date 0, for a given investment vector a  (ak)k2K and asset prices (E;q), each
agent i chooses consumption xi
0 2 R+, new equity holdings i 2 RK and portfolios
i 2 RJ such that
xi
0 + q  i + E  i 6 ei
0 + (E   a)  i: (5.1)
9At date 1, contingent to each output vector y, agent i consumes
yi
1(y)  R(y)  i + y  i > 0: (5.2)
We denote by Bi
Y (E;q) the set of consumption plans (xi
0;yi
1) for which there






















1(R(y)  i + y  i)Q(y;a):
A Y -allocation is a family ((x0;y1);a)  ((xi
0;yi
1)i2I;(ak)k2K) where the date-1
consumption only varies with rms' output, i.e., yi
1  (yi
1(y))y2Y . It is said to be


















Notice that, for any Y -feasible allocation, (yi
1)i2I denes a sharing rule of the ag-
gregate output.
A stock market equilibrium associated with  a is an array ((  E;  q);( x0;  y1))
such that (( x0;  y1); a) is Y -feasible and, for each investor i, the consumption plan
( xi
0;  yi
1) is optimal in Bi
Y (  E;  q).
Remark 5.1. There is no need to require market clearing for every output pro-
le y 2 Y . Given an equilibrium investment vector  a, we could restrict attention
to market clearing for output levels y occurring with positive probability in equi-
librium. Alternatively, we could replace the Y -feasibility condition by a market
clearing condition on portfolios, i.e.,






105.2 Optimal distribution of resources
As in Magill and Quinzii (2009, 2010), we focus our attention on the objective
of rms and therefore assume that, given any investment decision by rms, markets
assure an optimal distribution of resources among consumers. We propose to show
that this can be achieved if markets are complete with respect to aggregate output
represented by the set Z.
Denition 5.1. Markets are said to be complete with respect to aggregate output,
or Z-complete, if for every z 2 Z, there exists a portfolio (z;z) such that the
associated payo function satises
8y 2 Y; R(y)  z + y  z =
(
1; if y = z;
0; elsewhere.
Security markets have undergone a remarkable development in the last thirty
years with the introduction of more and more derivative contracts. Magill and
Quinzii (2009) used this observation to justify the assumption that the markets are
suciently rich to span the uncertainty in the outcomes of the rm, i.e., with respect
to Y . Completeness with respect to aggregate output is a weaker requirement. The
next result shows that Z-completeness is sucient to get an optimal distribution of
resources among consumers (the details of the proof are postponed to Appendix A).
Proposition 5.1. Consider a stock market equilibrium ((  E;  q);( x0;  y1)) given an
investment vector  a  ( ak)k2K. Assume that markets are complete with respect to
aggregate output. First, for each agent i, there exists  zi
1  ( zi
1(z))z2Z such that
8y 2 Y;  yi
1(y) =  zi
1(y):
Second, there exists   = ( (z))z2Z such that








Third, the consumption allocation ( x0;  y1) (or equivalently ( x0;  z1)) is Pareto opti-
















of the equilibrium conditional probability
Q(yjz) 
(
Q(y; a)=(z; a); if y = z;
0; elsewhere.
(5.4)
Notice that  (z) is the cost of the portfolio that replicates the Arrow security
contingent on z. In particular, the consumption plan ( xi
0;  zi














  ak +  Ek
i
: (5.5)
We can show that, for any given investment vector  a, the array ((  E;  );( x0;  y1))
is a stock market equilibrium if and only if (( ;  q);( x0;  z1)) is a reduced form















1(z) = z; 8z 2 Z;
and for each i, the consumption plan ( xi
0;  zi
1) is optimal in the budget set Bi
Z( ;  E; a)
of all consumption plans (xi
0;zi
1) satisfying Eq. (5.5). This result is standard in the
general equilibrium literature (see Magill and Quinzii (1996)).
Remark 5.2. In the denition of a reduced form equilibrium given an investment
vector  a, we could restrict attention to market clearing for every aggregate output
z occuring with positive probability|in the sense that (z; a) > 0. In particular, if
7Here, investment is arbitrarily xed. Pareto optimality of the consumption allocation ( x0;  y1)
given an investment vector  a means that we cannot nd another consumption allocation (x0;y1)
satisfying market clearing with the same investment vector  a and such that U
i
Y (x0;y1; a) >
U
i
Y ( x0;  y1; a), for every i, with a strict inequality for at least one i.
12agents understand at t = 0 that an aggregate output level ^ z is not possible at equi-
librium, i.e., (^ z; a) = 0, then the portfolio replicating the Arrow security contingent
on ^ z will not be traded, and we will have  (^ z) = 0. The results of Proposition 5.1
are still valid if we replace \Z-completeness" by \equilibrium completeness" in the
sense that for every possible aggregate output z with (z; a) > 0, there exists a
portfolio (z;z) that replicates the Arrow security contingent on z.
5.3 Objective of the rms
Consider an agent i that is a shareholder of rm k, i.e., i
k > 0. He would like
to set  ak in order to maximize his welfare. Given the equivalence between a stock
market equilibrium and a reduced form equilibrium, agents would like that rm k
chose  ak in order to maximize
e V k
Z(ak) =  ak + e Ek(ak);
where e Ek(ak) is agents' perceptions about the way the new investment decision ak
aected the price that the \market" would pay for the equity.
A minimal requirement is that agents have correct expectations at equilibrium,
i.e.,








We should now dene out-of-equilibrium price perceptions. We make the tradi-
tional behavioral assumption that agents conceive that each rm k has no market
power and does not aect market prices for aggregate output. This leads to the








where e Qk(yk;akjz) is the conditional probability (perceived by agents) that rm k's




represents the conditional expected production of rm k across primitive states in
which the equilibrium aggregated output is z.
13We make the additional behavioral assumption that agents have competitive be-
liefs: they are convinced that a change in the investment of rm k will not aect
the likelihood of each aggregate output z. In our opinion, this a reasonable assump-
tion to justify that agents (and rms) take prices for aggregate output as given.
Therefore, we say that agents form competitive beliefs when
e Qk(yk;akjz) = P(ffk(ak) = ykgjff( a) = zg): (5.6)
The interpretation for this is straightforward. Agents understand that if rm k
chooses the investment ak, then the risky output of the rm is represented by the
random variable ! 7! fk(!;ak). When the aggregate production is z, agents consider
that rm k's decision does not aect aggregate production and infer that every state
of nature ! in ff( a) = zg is consistent with aggregate output z, implying that
conditional on z, rm k's output belongs to the set ffk(!;ak) : f(!; a) = zg:
Remark 5.3. Actors in the economy act as if rm k's investment choices did not aect
the aggregate output. This is the analogue of the classical price-taking assumption
for this environment. Economists sometimes use the metaphor of continuum sets
of agents and rms to illustrate a scenario in which independent actions do not
impact aggregate variables. In this case, e Qk(yk;akjz) should be interpreted as the
conditional output distribution of a given rm which invests ak while all other innite
rms invest ( ak0
)k06=k and the average aggregate output remains z.
Theorem 5.1. Let ((  E;  q);( x0;  y1)) be a stock market equilibrium associated with
the investment vector  a  ( ak)k2K. Assume that
 markets are complete with respect to aggregate production;
 each rm k has chosen  ak to maximize the market value
V k







where beliefs e Qk(;akjz) are competitive in the sense of Eq. (5.6) and  (z) is
the price of aggregate output z.8
Then the Y -allocation (( x0;  y1); a) is ecient.
8This is the market price of the portfolio that replicates the Arrow security contingent on z.
14Proof of Theorem 5.1. Consider an alternative Y -feasible allocation ((x0;y1);a). For
every i, we denote by zi
1 the sharing rule (zi
1(z))z2Z such that for every z with









where we recall that Y (z) is the set of production vectors y consistent with aggregate
outcome z, i.e., Y (z)  fy 2 Y : y = zg. For z satisfying (z;a) = 0, we can select
any arbitrary sharing rule, for instance, zi
1(z) = z=(#I). Notice that ((x0;z1);a) is
a Z-feasible allocation and, thanks to (strict) concavity of ui, it satises







Following Proposition 5.1, for each i, there exists  zi
1  ( zi
1(z))z2Z such that  yi
1(y) =
 zi





















for all Z-feasible allocation ((x0;z1);a).
Let us rst write agents' utilities in terms of competitive beliefs, as given in













e Q(y;ajz) = P(ff(a) = ygjff( a) = zg)





e Q(y0;ajz)(z; a) = (z0;a); (5.7)












































1(y0)) e Q(y0;ajy)Q(y; a): (5.8)
Similarly, for ( xi
0;  zi



































1(y)) e Q(y0;ajy)Q(y; a): (5.9)








1; a) and xi
0 = xi
0    xi
0:













1(y0)    zi
1(y)] e Q(y0;ajy)Q(y; a):




1(y0)    zi

















 (z)[y0   z] e Q(y0;ajz);




0), as proved in Proposition 5.1.
Dene










 (z)z e Q(y0;ajz):










Notice that   =
P
k2K  k, where
















The desired result,  k = V k
Z(ak), follows from the the absence of externalities|that











y02Y e Q(y0;ajz) = 1,
we have











Notice from Equations (5.4) and (5.6) that competitive beliefs e Q(y; ajz) at the equi-
librium investment vector is correct in the sense that it coincides with Q(yjz). There-
fore:






y e Q(y; ajz):
17In particular, we have    =
P
k2K   k, where









The desired result,   k = V k
Z( ak), follows again from the absence of externalities.
Remark 5.4. We do not address in this paper the issue of existence of a stock
market equilibrium with investment levels that maximize the market value dened
in Theorem 5.1. There is only one technical diculty that deserves attention: the
convexity of the rms' decision problem. One may assume, as in Magill and Quinzii
(2009), that the set Ak of investment possibilites is a convex (and closed) subset
of R+. For simplicity, we have made the assumption that the set Y k of possible
outcomes for each rm k is nite.9 Allowing for a continuum of possible outcome
levels, one may follow the standard general equilibrium literature by assuming that
each production function ak 7! fk(!;ak) is continuous and concave. This would
imply that rm k's objective function
ak 7 ! V k





is concave. Existence would follow from standard arguments.10 Alternatively, if one
prefer to work with nite production sets (Y k)k2K, one may model the production
sector with a continuum of rms and attempt to apply Lyapunov's theorem to
overcome the convexity issue.11 This approach would involve serious mathematical
complications and checking its validity is beyond the scope of this paper.
9The assumption that Y
k is nite is only used in this paper to simplify the notation (allowing
us to use summations instead of integrals).
10In equilibrium, the set of possible aggregate production z will be nite given that the set of
primitive states of nature 
 is nite. This occurs regardless of the properties of (Y
k)k2K, since
(z; a) > 0 if and only if f(!; a) = z for some !. Therefore, the assumption of equilibrium-
completeness (see Remark 5.2) would only require a nite number of assets being traded in equi-
librium.
11Considering a continuum of rms does not necessarily mean that we have identical rms. We
may replace the nite set K by a non-atomic measure space (K;K;), where (K;K) is a measurable
set of rms' characteristics and  is a distribution measure on K.
186 Relation with the literature
We have proved that, even when markets are complete only with respect to
aggregate output, it is possible to nd a prot-maximization criterion for rms' in-
vestment decisions that implies Pareto optimality. Equilibrium prices for aggregate
output play a crucial role by conveying part of the socially relevant information, but
they are not sucient. The incompleteness of markets with respect to exogenous
states of nature can be subsumed if agents and rms have competitive beliefs about
the impact of new investments over the conditional distribution of each rm's output
given the equilibrium aggregate output. More precisely, Theorem 5.1 states that a
criterion rm k should maximize to obtain a Pareto optimal equilibrium is
V k
Z(ak;  ) =  ak +
X
z2Z
 (z)EP[fk(ak)jf( a) = z]:
Recall from Eq. (5.3) that the price of aggregate output z satises  (z) = (z; a) (z),
where   is the Z-sdf dened in Eq. (3.3). We then get the following expression for
the rm's objective
V k




 (f(!; a))fk(!;ak)P(!): (6.1)
We will now compare this objective with some others proposed in the literature.
6.1 Standard valuation with prices for primitive causes
When markets are 
-complete, the rm can use the market price  p(!) of each
primitive cause ! to compute the net present value of its investment
V k






We know that, if ( p;( x0;  x1)) is an 
-competitive equilibrium where the investment
vector ( ak)k2K is chosen by rms to maximize the objective V k

(;  p), then the allo-
cation of goods and investment is ecient.
We show that the standard objective V k

(;  p) coincides with our objective V k
Z(;  )
under the 
-completeness assumption. Recall that  p(!) =  m(!)P(!) in any 
-




0) is the 
-sdf. Since
( x0;  x1) is Pareto optimal, we have seen in Section 3 that  x1 is measurable with
19respect to f( a), so that we can write
 p(!) =  m(!)P(!) =  (f(!; a))P(!) =  (f(!; a)); (6.2)
where   and  |respectively dened by Eq. (3.3) and (5.3)|are the Z-sdf and the
prices of aggregate output associated with the Z-representation ( x0;  z1) of ( x0;  x1).
It then follows from Eq. (6.1) that the standard objective V k

(ak;  p) coincides with
our objective V k
Z(ak;  ).
When nancial markets are Z-complete but not 
-complete, they do not ex-
plicitly price every primitive cause !. Our contribution consists in showing that
every rm can recover the stochastic discount factor  m(!) using the prices of traded
assets. Equation (6.2) tells us that all rms should set  m(!) =  (z), where  (z)
is the sdf inferred from market prices at the aggregate production z consistent (in
equilibrium) with the primitive cause !, i.e., z = f(!; a). We stress that, by doing
so, rm k does not take into account the fact that the new investment ak aects
aggregate output in state !.
6.2 Firms valuation with prices for aggregate output uncertainty
Magill and Quinzii (2008) and Magill, Quinzii and Rochet (2011) argue that if
rms maximize the market-value criterion when nancial contracts are written on
outcomes then the resulting allocation is (generically) not Pareto optimal. This
statement seems to contradict our main result Theorem 5.1. The dierence stems
from the denition of market value. To illustrate our point, consider a stock market
equilibrium ((  E;  q);( x0;  y1)) with an investment vector  a. We have seen (Proposi-









where  (z) is the Z-sdf. Since we have
Q
k(ykjz) = P(ffk( ak) = ykgjf( a) = z);









ffk( ak) = ykg \ ff( a) = zg
i
:
20Based on this valuation at equilibrium, there are dierent ways of dening agents'
perception of rm k's equity value when its manager contemplates an alternative
investment ak. A rst possibility consists in replacing the expression ffk( ak) =
ykg \ ff( a) = zg by ffk(ak) = ykg \ ff(ak; a k) = zg. This leads to the
following objective function
b V k












ff(ak; a k) = zg =
[
y2Y (z)
ff(ak; a k) = yg;
we nd
b V k
Z(ak) =  ak +
X
y2Y
 (y)ykQ(y;ak; a k): (6.3)
This is in the spirit of Magill and Quinzii (2008) and Magill, Quinzii and Rochet
(2011).12 Under this view, rm k manager takes the stochastic discount factor   as
given but fully considers the impact of new investments on the probability of y and
therefore on the aggregate output z = y:
The objective b V k
Z diers from the one we propose since, following the competitive
tradition, we assumed that rms do not anticipate the eect of new investments over
aggregate variables. Formally, we replaced the expression ffk( ak) = ykg\ff( a) =
zg by ffk(ak) = ykg \ ff( a) = zg.
In an environment with non-marginal rms, one may think that rms should
maximize the objective function b V k
Z. Magill and Quinzii (2009) showed that maxi-
mizing this market value function does not always lead to Pareto optimality. This
is due to the fact that, when partially taking into account the eect of their actions
over aggregate variables, rms end up acting strategically and not competitively.
6.3 The expected social utility
After arguing that market value maximization|computed as in Eq. (6.3)|does
not necessarily lead to eciency, Magill and Quinzii (2009) investigated an alter-
12These models are not directly comparable to ours. Magill and Quinzii (2008), for instance,
analyze a moral hazard economy in which managers choose unobservable eort levels instead of
investments. The framework used in Magill, Quinzii and Rochet (2011) is much closer to ours, but
it presents a few dierences on the number of goods and structure of preferences.
21native objective function for rms. They have shown that if rms maximize an
\expected social" objetive function then the resulting allocation is Pareto optimal.
We propose to analyse the mechanics behind this result and illustrate the dierences
with respect to the arguments used in our proof of Theorem 5.1.
Consider a reduced form equilibrium ((  E;  );( x0;  z1)) associated with invest-
ment  a. In order to identify a sucient condition for eciency, we can make a
change in investment by modifying date 0 consumption. More formally, for every i,
x "i > 0 such that " 
P















1; a) and a = ( ak + "; a k):
Recall that for every xi












When computing the dierence i("i)|see Eq. (5.7) in the proof of Theorem 5.1|,







The term (z0;a) is the probability of the event ff(a) = z0g, and it can be expressed
as a function of the probability (z; a) of the event ff( a) = zg using Bayes' rule.
This allows us to compute the dierence i("i) factorizing the probabilities and
explains why the objective we proposed is comparable with the standard prot
maximization criterion.
Magill and Quinzii (2009) followed another route to compute i("i). In accor-
dance with their assumption that each rm k does take into account the eect of
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i("i) 6  " +
X
z2Z












Given this simple computation, one can exhibit an objective function that leads
to Pareto eciency. Indeed, if rm k maximizes the following \expected social"
objective function:
MQk




then the new allocation (( xi
0 ";  zi
1)i2I;a) does not Pareto dominate (( xi
0;  zi
1)i2I; a).
The point of the above argument is to show how Magill and Quinzii (2009)
came up with the \expected social" objective and illustrate the dierences with
respect to our approach. It turns out that their analysis is particularly important
to study decisions of large corporations that are \non-marginal"|in the sense of
being aware that their investment decisions aect the probability distribution over
the economy's output vector y = (yk)k2K. The objective function MQk
Z plays a
crucial role in Magill, Quinzii and Rochet (2011) to provide a theoretical foundation
for the theory of stakeholder rms as studied in Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2011).
In that perspective, our result shows that the stakeholder theory is not founded
by the mere presence of output-contingent contracts. An additional feature (e.g.,
a non-competitive production sector) is needed to reject prot-maximization as a
socially justied objective for rms.
A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 5.1
Consider a stock market equilibrium ((  E;  q);( x0;  y1)) given an investment vec-
tor  a. For every consumer i, the plan ( xi
0;  yi
1) is optimal in the budget set Bi
Y (  E;  q).
We let  zi
1 = ( zi
1(z))z2Z be the conditional expectation of  yi
1 dened by






23where we recall that Y (z)  fy 2 Y : y = zg. Since markets are Z-complete, for
each aggregate outcome z, there exists a portfolio (z;z) that replicates the Arrow







The portfolio (i;i) nances the future consumption represented by  zi
1 in the sense
that
8y 2 Y;  zi
1(y) = R(y)  i + y  i:











8y 2 Y; R(y) 
X
i2I
i + y 
X
i2I
i = R(y) 
X
i2I




where ( i;  i) is a portfolio nancing the equilibrium consumption plan ( xi;  yi
1).
Since equilibrium prices preclude arbitrage opportunities, we obtain
X
i2I
( q  i +  E  i) =
X
i2I
( q   i +  E   i):
We can now prove that
8i 2 I;  q  i +  E  i =  q   i +  E   i:
If this relation did not hold, we should have  q i +  E i >  q   i +  E   i for some i.
This agent i could then nance the future consumption  zi
1 together with the present
consumption  xi
0 + ", for " > 0 small enough. This leads to a contradiction since ui
0












This result implies that the consumption plan ( xi
0;  zi
1) is budget feasible for
24every agent. Since the Bernoulli functions ui
1 are strictly concave, we must have
 yi
1(y) =  zi
1(y), for every i and y.
Next, denote by  (z) the cost of the portfolio (z;z), i.e.,  (z) =  q z +  E z.
Since ( xi
0;  yi
1) is optimal in Bi









































This implies that agents have homogenous marginal rates of substitution.13 Since
the Bernoulli functions ui
1 are strictly concave, the consumption allocation ( x0;  y1)
is Pareto optimal if and only if ( x0;  z1) is Pareto optimal. The latter property is














  ak +  Ek
i
:















where Q(y;z) is the condition probability dened by
Q(yjz) 
(
Q(y; a)=(z; a); if y = z;
0; elsewhere.
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